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KEY POINTS
 The pandemic has compounded urban megaprojects’ 
exposure to political risk
 The pandemic also exposed the dire shortage of hard 
and soft infrastructure in modern cities
 Governments should therefore weigh building  
smart city from scratch vis-à-vis improving existing 
urban dwellings
 The case of Forest City shows that built-from-scratch 
smart city projects targeting wealthy foreigners 
need to adjust and cater to the needs of the local 
communities to contribute to a sustainable  
post-pandemic future
ISSUE
Smart cities are emerging as major engines for deploying intelligent 
systems to enhance urban development and contribute to the 
UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDG). In developing 
economies facing rapid urbanization and technological change, new 
cities are being built with smart technologies and ideals, complete 
with business districts and residential, retail, entertainment, medical, 
education facilities to entice businesses and talents to relocate. 
Governments tout the potential of such “greenfield” smart cities 
for innovation and sustainability. Yet such urban megaprojects are 
often extremely expensive, prompting governments to partner with 
private players such as property developers, investors, and tech firms 
to share the cost, and supply infrastructure and technologies. 
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As the centre of post-war new city development, China now also 
pioneers smart city initiatives, with about 500 pilot projects, over half 
of the world’s total (Xinhua, 2018). Chinese firms, with the experience 
of developing new cities and urban technologies at home, aspire 
to expand their businesses overseas. As their aspirations align with 
the development interests of the emerging economy governments, 
Chinese firms are emerging as crucial new players in the 
development planning. For instance, in Southeast Asia, Chinese firms 
play key roles in numerous existing or planned built-from-scratch 
smart cities (see Table 1). Beijing’s launch of the Belt and Road 
Initiative, and notably its “Digital Silk Road” component, provides 
high-level support for Chinese firms’ participation. At the 2017 Belt 
and Road Forum, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for cooperation 
in “digital economy, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology and 
quantum computing” and “the development of big data, cloud 
computing and smart cities” (People’s Daily, 2019).
The current COVID-19 pandemic has instilled new fanfare and 
uncertainty in smart city development. As the virus spreads rapidly 
among densely populated communities, prompting authorities to 
Source: Tritto and He, 2020. Updated by authors.
Table 1. Key Chinese-invested Built-from-scratch Smart City Projects in Southeast Asia
impose lock-downs and stay-at-home orders, public and private 
entities depend on technologies to continue operations.  
The pandemic also accelerates the demand for real-time data 
collection and analytics in the urban environment, as cities deploy 
solutions such as GIS-based emergency response dashboards, traffic 
control systems monitoring quarantine violations, or smartphone 
apps for location tracking and health monitoring. Yet the pandemic 
has also brought travel restrictions, supply chain disruptions, budget 
cuts and bankruptcies, project delays and cancellations, and low 
investor confidence. The poor pandemic preparedness in many 
countries also exposed the need for quality soft infrastructure, 
such as effective governing institutions and favourable policy 
environments, in complementing the hard, physical infrastructure 
to support the functioning of cities for all residents in times of 
crisis. How have the Chinese-invested built-from-scratch smart 
cities fared in the current pandemic? To what extent are such 
urban megaprojects resilient to external forces and unforeseen 
circumstances? This brief provides some exploratory analysis by 
drawing on one of the largest Chinese-invested smart city projects 
in Southeast Asia, the Forest City in Malaysia.
Country Project Chinese Investor(s)






Country Garden Group as  
a joint-venture partner (60%)
4 Billion (100 Billion 
Est. Total)
2013
1st Phase Completed 
in 2019
Philippines New Clark City
China Construction 
Engineering Corporation
2 Billion (China 
Industrial Park)
2016
Initial Operation  
in 2019
Philippines
New Manila  
Bay-City of Pearl
UAA Kinming  
(Filipino-Chinese Developer 
Consortium)









China Development Bank, 
Tus-Holdings, Huawei etc  
as partners
54.2 Billion (Total) 2017
MOUs Signed  
in 2018
Myanmar
New Yangon City 
Development
China Communications 




Started in 2020;  
Now Suspended
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ASSESSMENT
Located within the Iskandar Malaysia special economic zone 
in Johor, Malaysia, the Forest City project aims to build four 
artificial islands totalling 1,386 hectares over reclaimed land with 
an estimated cost of USD $100 billion, hosting 700,000 people 
upon completion in 2035. The project started in 2014 under the 
management of Country Garden Pacific View (CGPV), a joint venture 
between Esplanade Danga 88 Sdn. Bhd, a company owned by the 
State of Johor and its Sultan, and Country Garden, one of the largest 
private real estate developers in China. To encourage investment,  
the Malaysian government declared Forest City as a duty-free zone 
and provided tax incentives for qualified companies involved in 
tourism, education, healthcare, and green development, with  
a waiver on equity restriction for foreign investors. According to 
Forest City, the first island was completed and in operation by 2020, 
hosting residential units, commercial areas, an Industrial Building 
System factory, hotels, golf courses, and an international school. 
Designed to be a “smart and green city” in partnership with leading 
firms such as Tencent, Huawei, Cisco, Arup, Accenture, G-Energy, 
Celcom and Sasaki, the project has won five Sustainable Cities and 
Human Settlements Awards.
As an ambitious city-building project driven by foreign investment, 
the Forest City case highlights that investment risks could come 
from external players in both home and host countries. At its 
inception, Forest City primarily targeted Chinese investors, touting its 
location as being “right next to Singapore” while offering property at 
a fraction of the cost in Singapore, freehold properties as opposed 
to leasehold properties available in China, migration through the 
“Malaysia Second Home Program”, and high-quality lifestyle for 
expats and families. However, the Chinese government moved 
to control capital outflow into overseas real estate investment 
in 2017, after the Yuan suffered a volatile trading year. This led 
to declining interests from Chinese investors and disputes on 
contracted purchases, as some property buyers reportedly had 
to pay a penalty of 30 percent of the purchase price to cancel the 
purchase (Ho, 2017). Forest City was then embroiled in a political 
battle in Malaysia’s general election in 2018, as opposition politicians 
including Mahathir Mohamad campaigned against then ruling 
party that supported the project, attacking Forest City as “building 
a huge Chinese city in Malaysia”. After Mahathir came to power, he 
remarked that Forest City “cannot be sold to foreigners”, while later 
clarifying that foreigners could invest in Forest City but should apply 
for residency through the Second Home program. The Minister of 
Housing and Local Government also criticized that “it will not be 
fair for the locals if Forest City only caters for foreigners” (EdgeProp, 
2019). The changing political environments led to CGPV diversifying 
the target market to also court investors from Southeast Asia, Japan, 
South Korea, and the Middle East. The firm reportedly planned to 
offer affordable plans that “cater to the needs and tastes of locals” 
(EdgeProp, 2019), yet no details have been released.
The COVID-19 pandemic has magnified the challenges for 
megaprojects primarily catering to high-end property investors 
from overseas. Forest City’s first phase of residential units was priced 
ranging from RM13,000 psm to RM18,000 psm ($399 psf to $552 
psf ), effectively excluding most locals from buying (Bong, 2019). 
Yet Malaysia’s Movement Control Order (MCO) since March 2020 
has barred foreigners from entering the country, leading to a halt 
in property tourism and a plunge in Forest City property sales, with 
sources saying that “sales have dropped over 90% with typically no 
visitors” (Kumar, 2020). In addition, many Chinese migrants living 
in Forest City reportedly left Malaysia due to the financial and 
psychological impacts of the pandemic, planning to sell their homes 
remotely rather than waiting to see when they would be allowed 
to return (He, 2020). Reclamation for the second island, planned 
to be Forest City’s central business district and tourism zone, has 
reportedly slowed down considerably due to government-imposed 
lockdown measures (Kumar, 2020).
These recent developments have reinforced investors’ aversion to 
risks during the pandemic, casting uncertainties on the long-term 
viability of building four islands through high-cost reclamation. 
Yet while sales to foreigners are slow to recover, local demand for 
new property may rebound more quickly, aided by the Malaysian 
government’s post-pandemic home ownership campaign providing 
financial assistance from banks and tax agencies to local buyers 
(Kumar, 2020). Therefore, a prudent option could be repositioning 
the project for the local market, offering more affordable options for 
local buyers, or converting unsold properties to alternative uses for 
local population.
RECOMMENDATION
How can we make current cities more resilient during pandemics? 
What has the pandemic taught us in terms of needs and capacity 
of current cities? Are these new “smart” cities pandemic-resilient? 
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the scarcity of hard and soft 
infrastructure of current cities, such as physical spaces, resources, 
human capital, tech know-how, organizational and institutional 
capacity to deal with these multi-scalar types of issues. Urban planners 
and policymakers should therefore acquire important lessons from 
this experience to plan for the post-pandemic future of cities.
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Some fundamental considerations can also be drawn from  
a preliminary assessment of the megaprojects in Table 1. Apart  
from the Forest City, almost all have faced delays or suspensions.  
Some of them, such as the New Yangon City Development,  
have radically changed their bidding process to become more 
open and innovative by experimenting with the Swiss Challenge 
model, but have been suspended due to current political turmoil 
in Myanmar. Urban megaprojects in Southeast Asia have proved 
to be quite exposed to political risks, and the Forest City case is no 
exception. Ultimately, we should question whether smart cities 
improve the lives of ordinary citizens. If they don’t, then this means 
they are not inclusive, nor smart, therefore we propose the following 
recommendations: 
• National and local governments ought to develop and implement 
comprehensive long-term planning for smart cities by carefully 
assessing the need for new, built-from-scratch developments 
vis-à-vis improving existing urban dwellings. The pandemic has 
highlighted the need to prioritize investments to strengthen 
public services in existing cities.
• Host governments should define scopes that are financially 
and socially sustainable, and develop supportive governing 
institutions to coordinate efforts at different governance levels. 
The coordination and screening of foreign investments in the 
country should be strategically performed by both national and 
local governments to fit their sustainable development strategies.
• New projects should target middle-income residents and 
generate benefits also for the hard-hit low-income population.  
As the pandemic is set to increase the income gap and  
socio-economic inequality, host country governments should 
support this with relevant policies.
• Regulators need to proactively engage all interested parties and 
enhance information flow between local community members, 
governing institutions, and foreign investors to identify local 
concerns and address grievances in a timely and mutually 
acceptable manner, which in turn would help ensure project 
success and sustainability outcomes.
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